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2  Government Expenditure 
and Revenues 
As described in the previous chapter, the public sector in the Philippines has 
historically  been  rather  small.  Government  expenditure  averaged  10  to  11 
percent  of  GNP,  with  total  government  revenues  somewhat  less  than  this 
amount.  The developmental  role  of  the  public  sector  was  minimal;  most 
government outlays were for recurrent expenses, and only about 2 percent of 
GNP  was  spent  on  public  investment.  Under  relative  neglect,  much  of 
Philippine  infrastructure deteriorated  in  the  generation  after  independence. 
This was particularly true of the road network and of almost all infrastructure 
outside  of  Manila  and  Central  Luzon.  To  some extent  this  small  scale of 
government was the  product of  ideology  inherited from the United  States, 
but funding had always been a more concrete obstacle to an increased public 
sector role in the  Philippines.  Resistance to revenue  measures  in Congress 
limited the expansion of government expenditure. 
Sluggish economic growth during the import decontrol period in the early 
1960s led  to  more  support in  the  Philippines  for an  activist government. 
Ferdinand Marcos drew on this sentiment in his election campaign in  1965, 
and he greatly increased  infrastructure investments during his first term. But 
this  first  term  was  only  a  precursor  for  what  was  to happen  after  1972. 
Martial  law  transformed  the  character  of  the  state,  greatly  increasing  its 
expenditure,  regulatory,  and  allocational  role.  Although  security  concerns 
were  the  pretext  for the  declaration  of  martial  law  in  1972,  more  rapid 
economic growth quickly became the regime's claim to legitimacy. Greatly 
increased  public  expenditure,  particularly  public  investment,  was  the 
centerpiece of the government program.  With Congress no longer function- 
ing  and  Marcos  able to rule by decree, the  way  was  cleared  to both  raise 
domestic revenue in support of public expenditure and solicit outside sources 
of  finance.  The  previous  inactivity  and  small  scale  of  the  Philippine 
government  made  the  country  an  attractive  candidate  for external  project 
support under a modernizing government.  As described below,  the country 
was very successful in raising external funds for investment. 
Philippine statistics make it difficult to document the growth of the public 
sector in the early martial law years.  Public finance data before  1975 cover 
only spending obligations,  not actual outlays.  Since the budget was subject 
to  frequent  revision,  obligations  and  outlays  often  differed  substantially. ' 
Budget obligations  by  category  for  1969 through  1975 are shown  in  table 
2.1. Actual outlays of the national government for 1975 onward are given in 
table 2.2. 
Since government expenditure was rising in the early years of martial law, 
obligations ran ahead of actual outlays. But the actual growth of expenditure 402  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
Table 2.1  National Government Budget, Obligation Basis, 1%9-75  (percentage of GNP) 





































































































































Source:  World Bank (1976, 547-48). 
Nore:  Fiscal year from July  I  to June 30. 
was substantial. National accounts figures show a 15 percent per year growth 
in government expenditure from 1972 to 1975, with an almost 30 percent per 
year growth in total fixed investment outlays, including those by government 
corporations.  By  1976 total government expenditure had risen to 15 percent 
of  GNP and  investment expenditures  had  climbed  to 6.6 percent  of  GNP 
(table 2.3). 
The change  in  priorities  is  clear  from  shifts  in  the  obligational  budget 
in  the  early  years  of  martial  law.  Within  current  expenditures  there  is  a 
huge increase in commitments  for defense, which rose  from 13 percent of 
the budget  in  FY  1972 to almost 22 percent  by FY  1975 (see table 2.1).2 
Subsidies  also  increased  rapidly  as  the  government  sought  to  limit  the 
domestic  price  rises  of  grains,  petroleum  products,  and  fertilizer  after the 
first oil shock.3 The more activist role of the government is also reflected in 
a  shift  in  current  expenditures  away  from  social  welfare  (education  and 
health) and toward economic services, particularly  agriculture and transpor- 
tation.  The shift in  investment  priorities  in  the  early years of  martial  law 
is shown in table 2.1. Increased investment expenditures went into transpor- 
tation  (roads, highways,  and ports),  imgation,  and  power  and  rural  elec- 
trification. Table 2.2  National Government Expenditures (percentage of  GNP) 
I975  1976  1977  I978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
Expenditures  16.0  15.2  14.9  14.8  13.7  14.4  15.8  15.7  14.0  12.7  13.5  17.8  17.0 
Current  12.8  11.8  11.6  10.9  9.5  9.3  8.7  9.2  9.1  8.1  9.1  10.8  13.5 
Personnel  10.4  10.3  4.2  3.8  3.5  3.5  3.2  3.7  3.2  3.9  4.0  4.6 
Maintenance, operations  5.3  4.1  4.1  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.1  2.4  2.2  2.4  2.7 
Interest  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.8  0.9  0.8  1.1  1.3  2.0  2.5  3.5  5.2 
Transfers to local government  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6 
Transfers to GCs  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.6  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.3 
Capital  2.6  2.0  1.8  2.6  2.3  3.1  4.2  3.0  2.8  1.9  1.7  1.9  1.8 
Infrastructure  1.5  2.1  2.0  2.8  3.3  2.2  1.8  1.2  0.9  1.3  1.0 
Other capital outlays  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.9  0.7  0.9  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.8 
Equity and net lending  0.6  1.4  1.5  1.4  1.9  2.0  3.0  3.5  2.1  2.7  2.8  4.4  1.6 
Equity contributions  0.5  1.3  1.5  1.3  1.6  1.7  2.7  2.8  1.5  1.9  2.4  2.0  0.6 
Net lending  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.3  2.4  1.0 
(Assistance to GFIs)  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.0  1.6  1.9  2.6  0.1 
Revenues  14.4  13.4  13.0  13.6  13.5  13.1  11.8  11.4  12.0  10.8  11.5  12.8  14.6 
Budger surplusldef cit  -1.6  -1.8  -1.9  -1.2  -0.2  -1.3  -4.0  -4.3  -2.0  -1.9  -1.9  -5.0  -2.4 
Source:  Philippines Bureau of  the Treasury, Cash Operarions Statement. 
Note: GCs are government corporations.  GFIs are government financial institutions. Table 2.3  Fixed Investment (percentage of GNP) 




Government  1.2  2.1  2.3  3.4  4.3  6.6  6.9  7.2  7.3  6.9  8.0  7.2  6.1  4.1  3.7  N.A.  N.A. 
government  1.1  1.7  2.1  2.9  3.8  3.3  3.4  2.6  3.3  2.4  2.0  2.5  2.8  1.4  2.0  N.A.  N.A. 
corporations  0.1  0.5  0.2  0.5  0.6  3.3  3.5  4.6  4.0  4.5  6.0  4.6  3.3  2.7  1.7  N.A.  N.A. 
Private  15.9  14.4  13.6  15.1  19.4  18.5  16.9  16.7  18.5  18.8  1X.1  18.5  19.0  16.0  11.5  N.A.  N.A. 
Total  17.2  16.5  15.8  18.5  23.7  25.1  23.8  23.9  25.8  25.7  26.1  25.6  25.1  20.1  15.1  13.2  14.6 
Memo: 
Total government 
expenditure  9.9  11.5  10.9  12.3  16.0  15.2  14.9  14.8  13.7  14.4  15.8  15.7  14.0  12.7  13.5  17.8  17.0 
Source:  NEDA. National Accounts Section 405  Philippinesichapter 2 
The most dramatic change in the budgetary process came in the emphasis 
on foreign funding.  The Philippine government  improved  its planning  and 
proposal  mechanism  and  solicited  funds  from  multilateral  and  bilateral 
sources. The Philippines met with considerable success in this effort; official 
aid flows more than doubled after  1972, and development loans rose from a 
total  during  the  1960s of  $338  million  to $1.6 billion  from  1970 to  May 
1976.4 Much of these funds flowed through publicly owned corporations. To 
increase the ability of  these  corporations  to borrow,  the government  raised 
their equity base through capital infusions,  and this is reflected in the sharp 
rise in equity contribution in the middle  1970~.~ 
2.1  After the First Oil Shock, 1975-79 
The first oil  shock  and  the  subsequent  collapse  of  commodity  prices  in 
1975 had  little  effect  on  the  Philippine  government’s  expenditure  plans. 
Martial law  politics  were  tied up in  a more activist and expanded  national 
government,  and  the  Philippines  found  sufficient  external  support  to 
continue  with  its  public  expenditure  program.  The  share  of  national 
government expenditures in GNP actually peaked in 1975 and remained near 
15 percent for the rest of  the decade. 
While  total  expenditures  stabilized,  public  investment  continued  to 
increase relative to GNP through  a striking realignment of  shares of current 
and capital expenditures.  By  1979 national government current expenditures 
as a share of  GNP had fallen by three percentage points (see table 2.2). In 
addition,  investment  expenditure  by  publicly  owned  corporations,  not 
reflected  in  the published  budget,  continued  to increase.  By the end of  the 
decade  most  of  the  government’s  infrastructure  investment  program  was 
conducted through  these  corporations.  The growth  of  government  corpora- 
tions  is  discussed  in  more  detail  below,  but  their  importance  in  public 
investment expenditures  is  easily  seen  from national  accounts  data.  From 
half a percent of  GNP in  1974 and  1975, investment by public corporations 
had risen to 4 percent of GNP by  1978 and 1979 (see table 2.3). Funding for 
these  corporations  came  primarily  from  foreign  loans  and  from  equity 
contributions and net lending from the national  government, which took up 
an increasing share of national  government capital outlays. 
Data  on  the  sectoral  allocation  of  public  investments  comes  from two 
sources.  The first is data  from  NEDA  on  its  infrastructure  program  (table 
2.4).  This  covers  the  bulk, but  not  all  of  public  investment.  The second 
breakdown  comes  from estimates  made by  a World Bank  mission  in  1983 
and is shown in table 2.5. Both sources show an increasing concentration of 
public  investment  in  infrastructure  during  the  1970s.  Transportation  and 
irrigation  diminish  somewhat  as  a  share of  investment  and  GNP,  while 
investment  in the energy sector increases greatly in importance. By the late 
1970s half of  public fixed investment was in energy projects. 406  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
Table 2.4  NEDA Infrastructure Program (in millions of pesos) 









4.0  4.9  5.2  4.1  5.0  4.4  4.6  4.9 
0.7  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.6 
0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4 
1.6  1.6  1.5  1.0  1.0  0.8  1.0  1.3 
0.9  1.5  2.4  1.9  2.6  2.4  2.3  2.3 
0.2  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2 
2.8  3.0  2.6  2.0  2.0  1.7  1.9  2.1 
1.2  1.9  2.6  2.2  3.0  2.7  2.7  2.8 
Source:  World Bank (1979), table 5.12, and World Bank (1984b), table  1.12a. 
Table 2.5  Public Fixed Investment by  Sector, 1978-83  (percentage of  GNP) 
1978  1979  1980  198  I  1982  1983a 
Economic services 
Agriculture,  forestq 









Total public fixed investment 





0.  I 
3. I 
0.9 















































































Source:  World Bank (1984b). table  1.16. 
"Figures for I983 are estimated. 
The  Philippine  energy  investment  program  was  an  ambitious  plan  to 
substitute domestic and other energy sources for imported oil, provide for 
additional capacity for economic growth, and extend electrification to rural 
areas. The Philippines, being mountainous and volcanic, offered a variety of 
possible  sources.  Hydroelectric  energy  was  developed  and  by  1979 
accounted for 21 percent of  total electricity generation. By  the  1980s the 
Philippines had  one of  the world's  most extensive systems of  geothermal 
energy. A small domestic oil field was developed, which in  1979 produced 
10 percent of the total oil supply, and Philippine coal reserves offered large 
potential  for  development.  However,  the  bulk  of  Philippine  energy 
investments went  into electricity generation. The institution through which 
these investments were made was the National Power Corporation (NPC), 
a government-owned corporation,  which  accounted for almost 80 percent 407  PhilippinesKhapter 2 
of  the energy investment program by  the end of  the  1970s. Between  1977 
and  1982, NPC’s  installed generating capacity rose  from  1,038 to  4,323 
megawatts . 
One particular  investment, the  Bataan  nuclear power  project,  is  worth 
describing in more detail, both because of its size and foreign loan exposure, 
and because of the controversy that surrounds it. The Philippine government 
made the decision to build a nuclear power plant in  1973, and by early 1974 
intensive  negotiations  were  underway  with  General  Electric  for  its 
construction. General Electric’s proposal was  the  construction of  two 600 
megawatt reactors for a total price of  approximately $500 million. 
The Westinghouse Corporation entered the competition for the plant at a 
late stage, but hired Herminio Disini, a presidential associate, to arrange a 
meeting with President Marcos and his cabinet in May 1974. At that meeting 
Westinghouse made an offer to build a complex similar to the GE proposal 
for about the same price. At the end of May, Marcos instructed NPC to sign 
a contract with Westinghouse, despite the fact that Westinghouse had not yet 
submitted a detailed proposal.’ 
By  the time the contract was signed in  February  1976 the proposal from 
Westinghouse was to build a single 626 megawatt reactor for a price of  $1.1 
billion,  or  roughly  quadruple  the  cost  per  megawatt  of  the  original  GE 
proposal.  The  project  was  supported  by  a  loan  and  additional  loan 
guarantees  from  the  Export  Import  Bank  of  the  United  States.  The 
Westinghouse plant had a checkered history. The site approval process went 
on longer than  anticipated because the plant  was  near an  active volcano, 
there was vociferous domestic opposition to the plant, and construction was 
halted for eighteen months after the Three Mile Island accident in the United 
States  in  1979.  The  renegotiated  contract  with  Westinghouse,  including 
inflation, delay costs, and capitalized interest, was for $2.2 billion, making 
the nuclear power plant alone responsible for almost one-tenth of Philippine 
external debt.  Although  almost  finished, the  plant  never opened.  Shortly 
after  the  Soviet  Union’s  Chernobyl  accident  in  1986,  President  Aquino 
announced that the plant would not be put into operation.’ 
In  addition  to  NPC,  two  other  government-owned  corporations  have 
played an  important role in the energy investment program. The Philippine 
National Oil Company (PNOC) has been  responsible for domestic oil  and 
coal development, as well as the geothermal energy program. The National 
Electrification Administration (NEA) extended loans to rural cooperatives to 
finance extensions of  the  electricity  distribution  system  and  to  construct 
small-scale electricity generating facilities. 
By the end of the decade total expenditure by the national government and 
public corporations exceeded 18 percent of GNP. Despite continued efforts, 
described  below,  to  raise  tax  collections,  national  government  revenues 
remained  at  about  13.5 percent  of  GNP,  leaving  a  substantial gap  to  be 
closed by  borrowing.’  Foreign loans provided much of  the funding for the 408  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
investment projects  that the Philippines  undertook; in fact, foreign-assisted 
projects made up  three-quarters  of Philippine  infrastructural  investment  by 
1979. But foreign  project  loans  had  requirements for domestic counterpart 
funds, funds that the national  government (or  a public  corporation) would 
put up for its participation  in the project. By 1978 the Philippine government 
was  having  difficulty  generating  sufficient  peso  funds  to  match  the 
counterpart requirements of  foreign-assisted projects.  Part of the response of 
the government to revenue and funding shortfalls was to squeeze the current 
expenditure portion of the budget.  In many cases this meant a reduction  in 
operating  and  maintenance  expenditures  for  the  existing  capital  stock, 
despite its increase as a result of the investment program. 
2.2  After the Second Oil Shock, 1980-83 
A second leap in public expenditure occurred in the wake of the second oil 
price shock. After a reduction in  1979, real national government expenditure 
rose by  13 percent in  1980 and by an additional  12 percent  in  1981. Once 
again the Philippine authorities had chosen to counteract  the external  shock 
with expansionary policies.  However, the domestic recession was worse this 
time than it had been  in the  1970s, and the Philippine  industrial sector was 
particularly  hard  hit.  Government  revenues  also  dropped  unexpectedly 
sharply, falling by  2 percent of GNP between  1979 and  1981. As a result, 
the national government budget, which was nearly balanced in  1979, was in 
deficit by over 4 percent of GNP in  1981. 
AS in  the  1970s, the  increase  in  outlays was  almost  entirely  a  rise  in 
government investment expenditure (see table 2.2). Real capital spending of 
the  national  government  nearly  doubled in  two years.  Government-owned 
corporations also increased their investment expenditure, so that total public 
sector fixed  investment  rose from 6.5 percent  of  GNP in  1979 to  over 9 
percent in  1981 (see table 2.5). 
The investment  program  was  similar  to that  of  the  1970s. The largest 
share  of  public  investment  went  to  energy,  with  transportation  a  close 
second.  The  Philippine  government  had  prepared  an  ambitious  ten-year 
energy  plan, which  was published  in January  1980. President  Marcos then 
ordered an accelerated energy program to compress most of the goals of that 
plan  into  five  years.  The  NPC  developed  an  accelerated  program  for 
conversion of oil-fired plants to other energy sources, against the criticism of 
the  World  Bank  and  Asian  Development  Bank,  and  was  proposing  new 
projects as late as 1983.'' 
But the 1980s also marked a shift in Philippine public investment strategy 
toward  a  greater  emphasis on  industrial  development.  One aspect of  this 
policy  was continued  investment  in, and expansion of, the country's export 
processing  zones.  The  second  was  the  Philippine  government's  Major 
Industrial  Projects  (MIPS).  The  MIPS  were  an  elaborate  and  expensive 409  PhilippinesKhapter 2 
thrust  into secondary  import  substitution  through  heavy  industrialization. 
The goals  were  to deepen Philippine  industrial  structure, reduce  the  heavy 
dependence  of  domestic  industry  on  imported  materials,  and  establish 
growth poles away from Manila. The eleven projects are listed in table 2.6. 
The decision to go ahead with the MIPS was made in 1979, after several 
years  of  discussion  in  the  Philippines.  The minister  of  industry,  Roberto 
Ongpin, was a strong proponent of the projects and pushed actively for them 
within  the  cabinet.  In  deciding  in  favor  of  Ongpin  and  the  MIPS,  the 
Philippine  cabinet  was  influenced  by  the  heavy  industrialization  thrust  of 
policy in many East  Asian countries during this period. Korea and Taiwan 
had  adopted extensive efforts to encourage heavy industry, but neighboring 
countries in Southeast Asia-Malaysia,  Thailand, and Singapore-were  also 
supporting  investments  in  petrochemicals,  aluminum  smelting,  pulp  and 
paper,  and other heavy  industries."  The government's lead agency for this 
industrialization  effort was the reactivated  National  Development Corpora- 
tion  (NDC),  which  was  attached  to  the  Ministry  of  Trade and  Industry, 
headed by Ongpin. 
The  projected  cost  of  the  original  proposals  was  $6  billion,  but  after 
critical  external  reviews,  the  projects  were scaled  back  and the  estimated 
Table 2.6  Major Industrial Projects: Schedules, Costs, Financing 
(in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Financing 
Start of  Private Equity 
Project/  Project  Government  Foreign 
Operations  Cost"  Equity  Domestic  Foreign  Loans 
Completed projects: 
Copper smelter 
Diesel engine manufacturing 
Cement industry coal 
Phosphatic fertilizer 
Coconut-based chemicals 
Started. but deferred projects: 
Heavy engineering 









1980183  344 
1980183  9 
1981183  37 
1981184  513 
1982184  116 










63  37  244 
4  5 
37 
60  40  413 




-  -  -  I61 
290 
- 
-  85  -  60  -  - 
Source:  World  Bank (1984b), table 4.  I. 
"Project cost includes fixed assets and interest during construction 
bSite development started in  1983. 410  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
cost  was  reduced  to  about  $4  billion.  The  financing  strategy  that  the 
Philippines adopted was to encourage foreign equity participation to cover as 
much of the costs as possible and to rely on foreign loans for the remainder, 
to minimize the use of  domestic resources in the projects (IMF 1984b). All 
but  one  of  the  projects  was  to  have  some government  participation  and 
ownership. 
The IMF,  World  Bank,  and  other  outside  agencies  were  critical  of  the 
MIPS,  as  is  carefully  phrased  in  their  reports  on  the  Philippines.  The 
Philippine government was committed under the first Structural Adjustment 
Program with the World Bank to rationalize industrial investment incentives 
and reduce their bias  toward  capital  intensity.  Yet  the MIPS  represented  a 
huge investment  in highly  capital-intensive  industry.  In a country  in which 
the average investment per industrial worker was about $20,000, the cost of 
completing five of  the  initial projects was estimated  to be  $3.4 billion,  or 
$500,000 per job created (Callison  1981, 24). 
The financial and operational history  of the MIPS is also shown in table 
2.6.  Much of  the  program  was  overtaken by  events in  the  1980s and  the 
difficulties in raising external finance.  In addition,  foreign equity participa- 
tion  never  lived  up  to  expectations,  resulting  in  a  larger  government 
participation.  Five  of  the  projects  were  completed, two  were  started but 
deferred in  1983 as a result of the debt moratorium,  and the remaining four 
were  deferred  at  an  earlier  stage,  before  contracting  took  place.  The 
expenditure  on  the  seven  projects  that  went  forward  amounted  to  $2.8 
billion, almost entirely financed through foreign loans. 
In  addition  to  increased  investment  expenditure  on  its  own  account, 
national government equity contributions and net lending rose sharply during 
this period, from 2 percent of GNP in 1980 to 3.5 percent by  1982. Some of 
this  increase  was  government  contribution  to  the  planned  investment 
program. However, two additional requirements emerged during these years. 
The  first  was  the  greatly  expanded  program  of  the  Ministry  of  Human 
Settlements,  headed  by  Marcos’  wife,  Imelda.  Only  limited  information 
exists on the activities of the  Ministry.  Originally  its efforts were directed 
toward housing construction and finance, but these rapidly expanded so that 
its  work  paralleled  much  of  the  efforts of  other ministries.  Much  of  the 
activity of the Ministry and most of its expenditure were done through public 
corporations and their subsidiaries.  Nineteen government corporations were 
attached  to  the  Ministry  for  Human  Settlements,  with  at  least  thirty-six 
additional  subsidiaries  one  level  down.I2 The  Ministry  and  its  attached 
corporations  were  active  in  housing,  food  distribution,  area  development, 
finance, energy, public utilities, hotels,  industry,  cultural affairs,  and health 
services.  Through  the  Home  Development  Mutual  Fund  (the  PAG-IBIG 
fund), the Ministry levied a payroll tax in support of  housing.  The Human 
Settlements  Development  Corporation  alone  received  P.  1.1  billion  in 
transfers from the national government,  making it the ninth largest corporate 
recipient. l3 411  PhilippinesKhapter 2 
But  there  were  other,  more  important  reasons  for  the  rapid  rise  in 
government equity  contributions and  net  lending.  The  domestic  financial 
crisis  in  1981 led  to  the  failure of  numerous  large  and  highly  leveraged 
companies,  many  of  them  owned by  presidential cronies.  The  Philippine 
government organized rescue operations for these firms, acting through the 
NDC and through government financial institutions, supporting the resulting 
deficits with  equity transfers from the government.  The  greatly  increased 
investment program of other public corporations and their almost nonexistent 
ability to generate funds internally led to increased equity transfers from the 
national government to  meet the peso counterpart requirements of  project 
loans as well as to provide finance. 
As the world and domestic recessions continued into  1982 and external 
debt continued to mount rapidly, the Philippine government tried to change 
course. National government capital expenditure on its own account fell by 
26  percent  in  real  terms  in  1982.  But  other  claims  on  the  government 
continued to increase. Control over the investment programs of state-owned 
corporations was weak, and their investment expenditure continued to climb, 
rising  to  5  percent  of  GNP  (see  table  2.5).  As  a result  of  this  and  the 
corporate rescue operations mounted  by  the government,  equity contribu- 
tions and net  lending rose by  17 percent in real  terms in  1982, enough to 
keep the share of national government expenditure in GNP almost constant. 
The  shift  in  government  priorities  in  the  1970s and  later,  the  almost 
desperate attempts to  keep capital inflows  going,  show up  clearly  in  the 
continuing pressure on  outlays for current operations. Government current 
expenditures, after dropping in the late 1970s, held at a little over 9 percent 
of  GNP until  1983 (see table 2.2). However, this figure is deceptive, since 
interest payments and transfers took up a much larger share of the total. Real 
wages  of  government  employees  fell  between  1979  and  1983,  while 
operations and maintenance expenditures were 14 percent lower in real terms 
in  1983 than in  1978, despite a greatly increased government capital stock 
(World Bank  1984b, 13). The Philippines continued to initiate new projects 
with foreign financing during this period, even as it had increasing difficulty 
in providing the required level of counterpart funds for existing projects. The 
reaction was to delay the implementation of existing projects and to squeeze 
current expenditures, particularly for operations and maintenance, in order to 
sustain  the  momentum  of  the  investment  program  and  maintain  foreign 
capital inflow. By the early 1980s, operations and maintenance expenditures 
had  been reduced to such an extent that the capital stock was deteriorating 
prematurely; the  Philippines  was  in  effect  consuming  its  existing  capital 
stock in order to maintain investment. 
Ironically, despite the abolition of Congress and the decree-making powers 
of  martial law, Philippine public expenditure continued to be constrained by 
the inability to raise government revenues. This was particularly true of the 
early  1980s,  forcing  the  delay  in  existing  projects,  the  compression  of 
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cases at short term. The sluggishness of domestic revenue generation is the 
next topic we examine. 
2.3  National Government Revenues 
The  level  of  taxation  in  the  Philippines  has  historically  been  low, 
consistent  with  the  country's  relatively  small  government  expenditure. 
International comparisons of  tax effort place the Philippines near the bottom 
among less developed countries, both  in terms of taxes collected  as a share 
of GNP and the rates of effective taxation of  the existing tax base.14 Before 
martial  law,  the  Philippine  Congress  had  been  a  consistent  obstacle  to 
increased  taxation  or  to  tax  reform  measures.  Dominated  by  the wealthy 
landowning class, the Congress viewed limited taxation as consistent with its 
own interests and as a way of  limiting the power of  the exec~tive.'~ 
There  was  widely  expressed  hope  under  martial  law  that  the  national 
government  would  become  more  effective  in  mobilizing  domestic  tax 
revenue  as  a means of  financing public  development expenditure. Recom- 
mendations  for raising revenue  generation  were contained in reports by the 
International Labour Office mission (ILO 1974) and in an extensive country 
report prepared by the World Bank in  1975 (World Bank  1976). There were 
ambitious  targets  in  the  1974-77  development  plan  to  raise  domestic 
revenue  generation  to  17  percent  of  GNP,  and  revenue  targets  were 
conditions included in the extended facility drawing from the IMF in  1976. 
The government  had considerable success in raising  revenues  during the 
first few years of martial law. The administration  quickly moved on several 
reform proposals  that had  long been pending in Congress. One of  the first 
presidential decrees was a tariff reform program that reduced the number of 
rate categories, set a minimum tariff rate of  10 percent, and eliminated duty 
exemptions for public bodies. Other decrees revised  the individual  income 
tax and the system of property taxation.  l6 
The tariff  revisions  and the elimination  of exemptions, coupled  with the 
rise in external prices, resulted in a large increase in tariff revenues, nearly 
doubling  the  share  of  import  taxes  in  GNP.  Taxation  of  exports  also 
increased during this early period. The export taxes that had been included in 
the 1970 stabilization program as temporary measures were made permanent 
in  1973.  In  early  1974 the  government  sought  to  capture  some  of  the 
windfall gains from the rise in international commodity prices. A base price 
was set at 80 percent of the February  1974 price for a variety of  commodity 
exports, and taxes of  20 to 30 percent were applied to the excess of  current 
prices above this base. 
The government  also announced  more  vigorous  enforcement of  existing 
direct  taxes  on  individuals  and  corporations, along with  threats  of  severe 
penalties for tax evaders. The number of corporations and individuals filing 
tax  returns  increased  sharply  in  1973,  resulting  in  much  higher  tax 
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The result of these efforts was an increase in the revenue mobilization of 
the national government from 10 percent of  GNP in the early  1970s to over 
14  percent  in  1975  (table  2.7).  In  the  years  that  followed  there  were  tax 
packages  with  revenue-enhancing  measures  introduced  almost  every  year, 
including  significant taxes on crude oil and petroleum products,  revisions in 
domestic sales taxes, and some increases in business taxes. Even with these 
continued efforts and the targets that had been set in the development plan 
and  in external  loans, the share of tax revenue  in GNP remained  constant 
until  1980. Despite all of  its running,  the government had just managed to 
stay in place and had  come nowhere  near its revenue  targets.  The reasons 
behind this sluggishness of revenues point out some of the difficulties of the 
Philippine  tax  system  and  some fundamental  problems  of  the  martial  law 
regime. 
The  increase  in  revenues  up  to  1975  had  been  heavily  dependent  on 
increased  taxes  on  international  trade,  and  the  share of  international  trade 
taxes in total tax revenue rose from one-third to almost one-half  by  1975. 
The premium duty system, which  was designed to capture price windfalls, 
led to greatly reduced collections from export taxes in 1975-77,  when world 
commodity  prices  fell  and  the  taxable  premium  disappeared.  Other early 
martial law tax measures represented only temporary gains. The tax amnesty 
brought in  a significant  amount of revenue, but the initial  caution that had 
inspired  additional  filings in  1973 subsided, returning direct tax collections 
to more normal levels.” 
Part of  the  revenue problem  of the  Philippines  was the high reliance on 
indirect taxes-taxes  on trade and on domestic sales-that  had low income 
elasticities and therefore required continuing additional measures to keep up 
with the growth of GNP. But in addition to low elasticities,  the Philippines 
also faced problems of erosion of the tax base and difficulties in administering 
the existing tax system. 
The  corporate  income  tax  is  a  case  in  point.  Despite  the  increasing 
importance  of  the  organized corporate  sector, collections  from direct taxes 
on corporations  fell  sharply as a percent  of  GNP in  the  remainder  of  the 
1970s.  Here the  problem  was mainly  the erosion  of the existing  tax  base. 
Fiscal incentives for industrialization had been a feature of Philippine policy 
since  independence,  but  the  Investment  Incentives  Act  of  1967  and  the 
Export  Incentives  Act  of  1970  provided  more  extensive  fiscal  tools  to 
channel resources. Each act allowed accelerated depreciation, tax deductions 
for  expansion  reinvestments,  tax  credits  for  domestic  capital  equipment, 
and exemptions from selected business taxes. During the martial law period 
these incentives were liberalized by presidential decree and were extended to 
other  industries,  including  agriculture. ’* In  addition  to  these  general 
incentives,  there  were  a  large  number  of  special  incentives  for  particular 
industries  granted  by  legislation  before,  and  by  presidential  decree after, 
martial law. The most important special incentives covered cottage industry, 
chemical fertilizers, mining, textiles, shipping and shipbuilding, tourism, and Table 2.7  National Government Revenues (percentage of  GNP) 
1970  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
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overseas construction.  Many  of  these  industries  were  of  particular  impor- 
tance  to  industrial  groups  or individuals  associated  with  the  martial  law 
regime.  In addition  to the  special industrial  incentives,  there  were  a large 
number  of  presidential  decrees  that  benefitted  particular  firms,  granting 
either  exemptions  from  import  duties  on  products  or  exemptions  from 
certain taxes. 
The result was a corporate tax  system that was highly complex, with  an 
array of deductions and loopholes,  and a low effective rate of collection.  A 
World  Bank  mission  in  1979 calculated  that  nearly  45 percent  of taxable 
corporations were exempt from paying taxes and that deductions claimed by 
corporations  amounted  to about  70 percent  of  gross  income  (World  Bank 
1979, 12). 
The  Philippine  tax  system  flags  after  1980,  just  at  a  time  when 
countercyclical and corporate  rescue outlays were  swelling the expenditure 
side of the budget. Total national government revenue fell from  13.1 percent 
of  GNP in  1980 to  11.4 percent  in  1982, recovered  slightly  in  1983, and 
then fell sharply in 1984. Almost every category of  taxes fell as a percentage 
of  GNP.  Part of this reduction is easily explained.  The weak economy  and 
corporate distress in the early  1980s depressed collections from a number of 
taxes.  But  in  addition,  tax  collections  fell  as a  result  of  several  policy 
changes. 
As  a part  of  the  first  structural  adjustment  loan  (SAL)  from the  World 
Bank,  the  Philippines  initiated  a  tariff  reduction  and  trade  liberalization 
program  starting  in  1981.  As  a  result,  tariff  collections  fell  from  24.5 
percent  of  total  imports  in  1980 to 18.6 percent in  1982, and then to  14.5 
percent by  1984.19 The effect of the tariff reductions was counteracted by an 
import  surcharge  that  reached  10 percent  by  1984 and  also  by  a  foreign 
exchange  tax  of  10  percent  that  was  briefly  in  force  between  June  and 
October 1984. 
The  substantial  drop  in  individual  income  tax  collections  was  more 
disturbing. Nominal individual income tax collections fell in  1982 and 1983, 
and their share in GNP fell sharply.  Between  1979 and 1984 the individual 
income tax  registered  a buoyancy  of  only 0.3, extraordinarily  low for this 
type of tax.”  There were two reasons for the drop in income tax collections. 
First, there was a major revision of individual income tax rules in  1982 that 
substituted  separate  schedules  for different  types  of  income  for the  global 
income tax system that preceded it. Other reforms adopted a modified gross 
income tax system for individual income, eliminating many deductions and 
reducing tax rates. 
These  reforms  were  adopted  in  order  to  simplify  the  tax  system  and 
increase  the  effectiveness  of  tax  administration.  While  the  reforms  were 
designed to be revenue neutral,  in fact they resulted in a substantial drop in 
individual tax collections. The reforms also shifted the tax burden away from 
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Revenue (BIR) of  taxpayers with  over  P.  1 million  in  income  found  the 
average tax rate declined from 48 to 32 percent for those who relied entirely 
on compensation  income, and from 29  to 9 percent  for those with multiple 
schedules,  between  1981 and 1982.21 
The second reason for the drop in personal  income tax collections  is an 
apparent  increase  in  the  amount of  tax  evasion.  Little  evidence exists on 
the trend of tax evasion, although the view of  increasing  evasion is widely 
held.  The level  of  tax  evasion was quite large, however.  An IMF mission 
conservatively  estimated  that  the  individual  income  tax  receipts  in  1984 
should  have  exceeded  P.  10  billion,  based  on  current rates  and  the  dis- 
tribution  of  household  income,  while  actual  collections  were  only  P.  4.5 
billion.22 
2.4  Failure of Taxation Efforts 
Despite the professed intent in Philippine development plans and external 
pressure  for  increased  revenue  generation  through  the  tax  system,  the 
Philippines  was not  successful  in raising  government revenues. The fall in 
tax  collections  during  the  early  1980s  was  an  important  factor  in  the 
country’s balance  of payments crisis and external  debt difficulties.  In part, 
the failure to raise the revenue  share reflects  the structure of the Philippine 
tax  system, Much of  the tax  system depended on indirect taxes on foreign 
and  domestic  trade  that  had  low  income  elasticities.  As  a  result,  the 
government had to make continuing tax introductions and modifications just 
to maintain the share of these taxes in GNP. 
But this explanation cannot be sufficient, for revisions in the tax structure 
itself formed an important part of the plans and of external conditions. The 
Philippines had on several occasions pledged to broaden the base of  the tax 
system and to  shift the emphasis toward direct taxes, away from taxes on 
international  trade.  The  reasons  for  the  lagging  tax  effort  were  more 
fundamental. 
To  a  large  extent  the  revenue  efforts of  the  Marcos government were 
vitiated by a growing array of  incentives, exemptions, and special privileges 
that steadily eroded the tax base. Much of the investment that was undertaken 
during the  1970s was done under Board  of  Investment  incentives, and  a 
growing  number  of  industries  benefitted  from  special  industry  incentives 
programs.  Despite the early efforts at removing tariff and tax exemptions for 
government corporations, these crept back into the tax system so that by  1983 
the value of government corporate tax exemptions was over P.  1.5 billion, or 
almost  4  percent  of  tax  revenue.23 Exemptions  also  went  to  private  or 
quasi-private  enterprises  engaged  in  commercial  activity,  displacing  tax- 
paying concerns. One example involves the Philippine  Veterans Investment 
and Development Company (PHIVIDEC), which was given tax  free impor- 
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to favored companies. Another example was Nivico, a private concern, which 
was allowed to import televisions tax and duty free to support a program of 
extending television use to the countryside. Nivico in fact sold the televisions 
in Manila and other major markets. 
The  Philippines  also  developed  a  number  of  special  tax  funds  with 
revenues  earmarked  for  a  particular  use.  Some  of  these,  such  as  the 
petroleum  industry special fund which  supported energy investments, were 
little different from general revenue taxation.  However, others were more in 
the  nature  of  private  funds  and  competed with  the  tax  system in  raising 
revenues. 
An  example of  the latter was the  Coconut Industry  Development Fund, 
which was supported by a levy on coconut production.  The coconut levy had 
a variety of  goals, including the maintenance  of domestic price ceilings and 
the capture of windfall gains in the mid-1970s. By the late  1970s it became 
a  privately  administered  fund  for  the  benefit  of  the  industry,  effectively 
controlled  by  Eduardo Cojuangco,  a  private  businessman and  a  friend  of 
Marcos. The levy was initially P.  150 per metric ton (about 12 percent of the 
price of  copra) and eventually  P.  1,000 per metric  ton  (32 percent  of  the 
copra price).  Revenues from  the  fund were  used  to purchase the  United 
Coconut Planters  Bank and much of the country’s coconut milling capacity 
through  the  United  Coconut  Oil  Mills  (UNICOM),  as  well  as  some 
expenditures  for replanting  and  various  benefits  for coconut farmers.  But 
much  of  the  revenue  collected  cannot  be  accounted  for;  the  fund  was 
privately administered  and not subject to audit. Estimates of the cumulative 
collections  from  1973 to  1983 range as high  as P,  9.7 billion, about  one 
quarter of  1983 tax collections  (Montes 1986, 44).24 
A second example of  a special tax that  competed with the domestic tax 
system  was  the  PAG-IBIG  fund  attached  to  the  Ministry  of  Human 
Settlements.  This was a compulsory savings scheme to provide housing for 
its members  and was  supported by  a payroll tax  of  3 percent.  Collections 
under the fund were P.  100 million  in  1981, 600 million  in  1982, and  1.1 
billion in  1983.25 
While these special levies were at times effective in raising revenue, they 
ranged  from being  beyond  the government’s control  (as in the case of  the 
coconut  levy)  to being  unavailable  for other pressing  budgetary  needs (as 
was the case with the oil industry special levy, which built up a surplus at a 
time  when  nonenergy  projects  were  being  delayed  for  lack  of  peso 
counterpart funds). And the existence and growth of these funds limited the 
expansion of the general revenue of the national government. 
Beyond  this  erosion  of  taxing  power,  the  revenue  experience  of  the 
Marcos  government illustrates  some  of  the  weakness of  the  martial  law 
regime  and  the deterioration  in  its  later  years.  While Marcos was able to 
dislodge the traditional elite from power with the declaration of martial law 
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early dissipation of  the land reform program in the  1970s was an indication 
that Marcos could or would  not  press his challenge  to the landed elite too 
far. The hold that the Marcos government had on power may have been too 
weak to allow a significant  increase in taxation  on the wealthy.  Instead,  he 
sought to create a competitive elite, using  the rent  mobilization  powers of 
government to favor his own interests and those of  his associates.  Many of 
the policy  measures benefitting  Marcos  and his  associates involved  special 
privilege or tax and tariff exemptions.  Thus the ability to raise revenue was 
compromised by the erosion of taxation  that this policy created.26 
The failure of  the revenue effort also illustrates the loss of  momentum of 
the  Marcos  administration  as  a  development-oriented  and  reforming 
government.  The decree-making power of the  martial  law  government was 
used initially to implement reform measures that had been widely discussed, 
but blocked  by  Philippine politics.  After the initial successes in the  1970s, 
the  character  of  the  martial  law  government  shifted  toward  concern  with 
regime maintenance and enrichment, and the decree-making power was used 
in more particularistic and preferential ways. Special exemptions for individ- 
ual  industries and, in  some cases, individual firms proliferated,  as Marcos 
associates were fostered.  Rules were enforced  in different  ways depending 
upon  the individual or  case involved.  In tax administration,  this meant the 
shift from  enhanced  participation  and  self-assessment  in the  early  Marcos 
years  to the  (perhaps traditional)  feeling  that the  rich  and  influential  were 
exempt from taxation. This was echoed in the perceptions of BIR employees, 
who were reluctant to pursue large taxpayers for fear of who their sponsors 
might  be.27 As  a result  the  compliance  and  self-enforcement  necessary  to 
make an income tax system function weakened considerably, and widespread 
evasion was the result. 
2.5  Public Corporations 
Focussing on the budget of the national government provides only a partial 
understanding of the Philippine fiscal position. During martial law there was 
a tremendous  growth in the number and  importance of government-owned 
corporations. These entities became the primary vehicle for infrastructural and 
industrial investment programs. And, although the accounts of these firms are 
not carried on the books of the national government, the corporations came to 
have an increasing share of the public sector deficit and of total public external 
borrowing. During the 1980s the continued investment of these corporations, 
coupled with their heavy losses, provided a huge drain on the national budget 
at a time when policymakers were belatedly trying to adjust to external shocks 
and the mounting debt burden. 
Although  many  government  corporations  were  audited  by  the  govern- 
ment’s Commission on Audit, there was no attempt until quite recently to put 419  PhilippinedChapter 2 
together consolidated figures for the government corporate sector. In fact, the 
report of a mission of the World Bank in 1983 was the first attempt to achieve 
a consolidation of their accounts  (World Bank  1984b). While  government- 
owned  corporations  existed before  the  martial  law period  in  the  financial, 
public  services,  and industrial promotion  areas, their role in the Philippine 
economy and in the public sector was relatively  small. At the beginning of 
martial  law there  were about 30 government-owned  corporations.  By  1984 
there were 96 parent companies,  with at least  149 subsidiaries.28 
The increasing  importance  of  these  firms  may  be  gauged  from  a  few 
summary  figures.  Investment  by  government-owned  corporations  in  1975 
amounted to 0.4 percent of GNP and 12 percent of public sector investment. 
By  1982 investment of public corporations was over 5 percent  of GNP and 
60  percent  of total investment of  the  public  sector.  By  1982 the deficit of 
public  sector corporations  had  grown  to over 2 percent  of  GNP, and their 
external debt was almost three-fifths of the public sector total. 
Data on the sectoral breakdown of  government corporations are shown in 
tables  2.8 and  2.9.  State-owned  financial  institutions dominate  in terms of 
gross  value  added.  However,  the  bulk  of  the  investment  and  the  use  of 
external funds was accounted for by  nonfinancial  public corporations.  The 
most  important  of  these  were  in  the  energy  sector,  but  government 
corporations  played  a  crucial  role  in  agriculture  (mostly  in  irrigation 
investments), transportation,  and later, in manufacturing.  Table 2.9 presents 
Table 2.8  Gross Value Added (GVA) of Government Corporations by Sector 
(in percentages) 
Shares of Total Government Colporation GVA 
1975  1978  1982  1984 
Agriculture  10.8  3.5  2.3  5.1 
Manufacturing  4.4  5.  I  5.3  6.0 
Electricity  2.9  8.3  10.6  30.7 
Finance  79.9  76.1  71.6  50.0 
Othersa  0.3  2.0  1.5  3.9 
All government corporations  IM)  100  100  100 
Transportation  1.7  5.0  2.7  4.3 
~ 







1.1  0.5  0.5  0.7 
0.5  0.8  1.1  0.9 
9.2  33.1  46.1  85.9 
I .0  3.4  2.2  2.5 
58.6  66.6  95.5  84.1 
3.0  3.7  5.3  3.7 
Source:  Manasan and Buenaventura (1986), tables 3, 4. 
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Table 2.9  Fifteen Major Nonfinancial Government Corporations 
Cash generation 
Capital  as % of  Debt 
Number of  Expenditures,  Capital  Outstanding 
Employees,  1980- 84  Expenditures.  1984' 


















































































Sources:  Presidential  Commission on Government Reorganization ( 1985b); and World  Bank (1986). vol. 3. 
tables 5-6,  5-7. 
Nufe: N.A. means data were not available.  and a dash indicates that the amount was negligible 
"Includes subsidiaries of  government firms, but not firms acquired from the private sector. 
Company Names:  NFA:  National  Food  Authority; NIA:  National  Irrigation  Administration; EPZA:  Export 
Processing  Zone  Authority;  NDC:  National  Development  Corporation;  NEA:  National  Electrification 
Administration;  NPC:  National  Power Corporation; PNOC: Philippine National Oil  Company; LRTA: Light 
Rail Transit Authority; MMTC: Metro Manila Transit Corporation; PNR: Philippine National Railways; PPA: 
Philippine  Ports Authonty;  LWUA:  Local Water Utilities Administration; MWSS: Metropolitan Waterworks 
and Sewerage System; HSDC: Human  Settlements Development Corporation; and NHA:  National  Housing 
Authority. 
more detailed  information  on the largest of  the  public  sector corporations. 
Within this group the NPC stands out, both for the size of  its investments 
and the size of  its losses during the early  1980s. 
As in other countries, the Philippines had a variety of reasons for using the 
corporate  form for major  infrastructure  investments. Government corpora- 
tions  offered  a  more  flexible  organizational  vehicle  for  many  objectives. 
Since they  were outside  the national government, they  were not  subject to 
the  same restrictions  nor  to  the  same pressures  of  the  budgetary  cycle. 
Corporations  were  not  bound  by civil  service  requirements  and could, and 
did, pay higher salaries than the government. Public corporations were also 
an effective way of  raising  salaries  for key  civil servants or for rewarding 421  PhilippinesiChapter  2 
political allies and military officers, either through seats on corporate boards 
or through corporate hiring of individuals who were then released to work at 
ministries on a more or less permanent  basis. 
The public corporations were outside the regular lines of authority of  the 
national government  and had substantial  independence. They could borrow 
in their own name and could, to a considerable degree, determine their own 
budgets.  Oversight and  control  by  the  government  was  often  lax.  Each 
corporation was attached to a government ministry, and the relevant minister 
had  a seat on the corporate board.  But in practice  this arrangement  did not 
provide  for effective  supervision. Cabinet ministers  often  sat on multiple 
corporate  boards. In  addition, a  presidential  decree or letter of  instruction 
could overrule any  minister  or policy  review  process, and those  who had 
direct  access  to President  Marcos used  it  extensively  to create functional 
autonomy  for their corporations. In certain situations, notably in the public 
corporations involved in the sugar and the coconut industry, the heads of the 
corporations  had  cabinet  rank  and  sole responsibility  for matters  affecting 
their  industry  and  were  able to win  out  in  key  battles  with  other cabinet 
ministers.29 Although  nominally  subject to government audit, many  of  the 
corporations resisted,  and accounts are difficult or impossible to come by. 
This  independence  and  relative  obscurity  was  a  decided  advantage for 
government  corporations  that  intervened  in  domestic markets, particularly 
where substantial rents were involved. In both sugar and coconuts huge sums 
of  money  were  collected  from  producer  levies,  In  addition  to  sugar and 
coconuts,  there  were  interventions,  through  government  firms,  in  food 
marketing  and  distribution  and  in  overseas  labor  services.  Government- 
owned corporations  also became  the favored  approach  for the  projects  of 
Mrs. Marcos, for heart and kidney research and treatment,  for international 
film exhibitions, and  for the  various  activities  of  the Ministry  of  Human 
Settlements. During  martial  law,  the  number  of  government corporations 
greatly proliferated,  in many  instances  far beyond  the natural monopoly  or 
public  good  rationale  that  justified  the  initial  corporate entities. Thus by 
1985 the Philippines had public sector corporations formed 
for any  or all  purposes, ranging  from banks,  nuclear  plant, real  estate, 
racehorses  and gamecocks, gambling casinos and lottery houses, poultry 
farms and  tomato paste,  to a dizzying array  of  Centers concerned with 
culture, music,  science,  health,  artists,  and  all  known  fields of  human 
endeavor including the meaning of  life. (Briones  1985, 2) 
Based  on  the  obligational  budgets  in  table  2.4  and  national  accounts 
investment  breakdowns,  the  investment  expenditures  of  the  government 
corporate  sector  increased  sharply  beginning  in  1976.  Estimates  of  the 
accounts of the nonfinancial public corporate sector are available starting in 
1978 (table 2.10).  These show a level of  investment by  public corporations 
in excess of 4 percent of  GNP at that time. Also evident from the table is the 422  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
Table 2.10  Public Nonfinancial Corporations, Cash Operations (in billions of  pesos) 
Year 
Government  Cash 
Investment  (% of  GNP)  Contribution  Generation 
Surplus/ 





































-4.1  (-2.3) 
-5.4  (- 2.5) 
-6.6  (- 2.5) 
-  8.0  (-2.7) 
-7.0  (-2.1) 
-8.1  (-2.1) 
-8.1  (-1.5) 
-6.7  (-1.1) 
2.6  (0.4) 
Source:  Philippines,  Government Corporate Monitoring Committee 
large jump in corporate investment that took place in 198  I as the Philippines 
moved  to offset the domestic recession,  accelerate its energy program,  and 
start on the MIPS. Between  1981 and  1983, over 65 percent of  public fixed 
investment was done by government-owned corporations. 
The fourth column in table 2.10 shows the cash generation of  the public 
corporations,  or  the  surplus  after  meeting  current  operating  and  interest 
expense that was available to fund investment. Cash generation by Philippine 
public  corporations  has  been  very  low,  averaging  only  6  percent  of  the 
annual investment  of the corporations covered  in the table.  To some extent 
this performance represents  the  long gestation times characteristic  of  many 
of  the infrastructural  investments,  coupled  with  a rapidly  expanding  public 
capital stock. But it also represents low profitability  of operation of  existing 
capital equipment. In some cases, tariffs for public services were set too low 
to  achieve  targeted  rates  of  return.  This  was  particularly  true  of  the 
electricity  charges of the NPC, which were judged in a  1979 study to be 30 
percent  below  the  long-run  marginal  cost  of  electricity.  Low  rates  of 
collection of existing tariffs have plagued the National Irrigation Administra- 
tion,  leading  to  minimal  cash  generation  in  that  agency.  Finally,  those 
government corporations  that  have engaged  in  lending  operations,  such as 
the  National  Electrification  Administration’s  loans  to rural  cooperatives  or 
the  Local  Water  Utilities  Administration’s  loan  to  local  water  authorities, 
have had large arrears in repayments, resulting in substantial losses in those 
agencies. 
Despite recognition of the problem and pressure from the IMF and World 
Bank  to  raise  public  corporate  revenue  mobilization,  increasing  the  cash 
generation of  public  corporations  was  made quite  difficult  by  the  inflation 
and  exchange  depreciation  of  the  1980s.  Although  there  were  repeated 
increases in rates, revenues of government corporations little more than kept 
pace with increases in domestic costs and debt service costs on foreign loans. 
(The  improvement  in  cash  generation  shown  in  table  2.10  for  1983 was 
largely the result of  an increase in arrears by  the NPC on external loans.) 423  Philippines/Chapter 2 
Low internal cash generation and high rates of investment resulted in large 
demands for external funds by  the government corporate sector. A large part 
of the burden was borne by contributions of the national government, and the 
remainder  through  external  borrowing.  Contributions  from  the  national 
government took the form of operating subsidies, equity contributions to the 
corporations, and loans. Each has a distinct accounting implication, but in 
practice  the  difference  among  them  was  blurred.  There  are  no  easily 
accessible data on  interest payments  from government corporations to the 
national  government,  and  there  have  been  numerous  instances  in  which 
outstanding  loans  were  converted  to  equity.  Public  corporations  have 
generally  not  paid  dividends  to  the  national  government  (Manasan  and 
Buenaventura 1986, 6-7). 
National government contributions to  public corporations are  shown  in 
table 2.11. By  the 1980s as much as 20 percent of government expenditure, 
and in several cases all of  the national government deficit, were accounted 
for by  these contributions. These are explicit contributions from the national 
government to public corporations; they do not include the implicit subsidies 
offered to these firms by tax and import tariff exemptions. In  1983 tariff and 
tax  exemptions to government-owned corporations were estimated to have 
been worth P.  1.5 billion, or 20 percent of explicit budgetary contributions to 
the corporations. Although  these exemptions were reduced  by  presidential 
decrees in  1984, many were reinstated during the following months.30 
More extensive data on the financing of  investment are available for the 
fifteen largest public corporations and are shown in table 2.12. Internal cash 
generation  financed less than  10 percent  of  investment over the  1978-84 
period.  National  government  contributions  made  up  45  percent  of  the 
additional funding requirement, and the remainder came from external loans. 
The  domestic capital  market  was  not  tapped  as  a  source of  funding  for 
government corporations. In fact, they slightly reduced their indebtedness to 
Table 2.11  National Government Contributions to Public Corporations 
(in millions of  pesos and percentages) 
Share of 
Current  Net  Government  Government 

















































































Source:  Manasan and Buenaventura (1986), table 8. 424  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
Table 2.12  Sources of Financing for Fifteen Major Nonfinancial Corporations 
National  Net  Net 
Capital  Internal  Total  Government  Domestic  Foreign 

































(in millions of  pesos) 
1.636  5.645  2,236 
2,917  6,601  3.335 
1,083  9,996  4,300 
705  14,588  7.169 
-  1,985  17,013  8,378 
1,889  17,559  6,402 
2,831  12,451  5.664 
-~ 


























































Source: Manasan and Buenaventura (1986). table  14 
"Including change in cash balances. 
the  private  sector  over  this  period.  Domestic  counterpart  funds  for 
investment  projects  were  made  up  entirely  from  contributions  from  the 
national government, which explains the correlation between size of  national 
government contributions and external borrowing that has been noted for the 
Philippines.31 
Public  corporations  in  the  Philippines  played  a crucial  role  in  the  early 
1980s.  The  combination  of  their  large  funding  requirements  and  the 
difficulty in bringing  their outlays under control  gave  public expenditure a 
momentum that could not be reversed when there was a critical need for the 
Philippines to adjust to the worsened external environment. Monitoring  and 
control  of  public  enterprises  was  made more  difficult  by  the  fact  that  the 
available budgetary information covered only the national government; there 
were  no  integrated  accounts of  expenditure and  funding  requirements  of 
public corporations.  After the Philippine  debt crisis, at the prodding  of the 
IMF,  the  government put  together data  on the  major public  corporations. 
This data, from which the tables in this section have been  compiled, make 
possible the construction of  accounts for the nonfinancial consolidated public 
sector going back  1978. These figures give a much clearer indication of the 
fiscal  stance  of  the  Philippine  government.  Before  we  examine  these 425  Philippines/Chapter 2 
consolidated  accounts, we review  briefly the two remaining  components of 
the  nonfinancial  public  sector,  local  governments and  the  social  security 
institutions. 
2.6  Local Governments 
Local governments  have not played an important role in the Philippines. 
Government  functions and authority have been concentrated in Manila, and 
this  centralization  was  greatly  strengthened  under  martial  law.  Local 
government expenditure has been constrained by  severe revenue limitations. 
Property  taxes are the primary source of revenue, but tax rates are low and, 
since no process of cadastral surveying exists, many properties are not on the 
tax rolls. The expansion of  activity by the communist New  People’s Army 
(NPA) has reduced tax collections  in many localities,  and in some areas the 
NPA operates as the only government, levying taxes of its own. In addition 
to local sources, about 40 percent of the revenue of  local governments comes 
directly  from  the  national  government  through  revenue  sharing  and  as 
additional aid and allotments.  Total revenues of  local governments from all 
sources have hovered around 2 percent of GNP (table 2.13). 
Local  government  expenditure  has  been  almost  entirely  for  current 
operations. Capital  expenditures of  local  governments, on roads and local 
facilities,  have  made up  only  about  15 percent  of  total  local  government 
expenditure.  Borrowing  by  local  governments is  possible,  but  in  general 
strictly  limited.  In  total,  local  governments have  run  balanced  budgets  or 
small surpluses. 
2.7  Social Security Institutions 
The  Philippines  has  two  government-sponsored  employment  security 
institutions.  The  larger,  the  Social  Security  System  (SSS),  covers  nine 
million  workers  in  the  private  sector,  while  the  Government  Service 
Insurance  System (GSIS)  covers about  one million  government workers. 
Total revenue collection by these bodies has averaged just under 2 percent of 
GNP, while their surpluses (after expenses and net lending to members) have 
been  about  0.8 percent  of  GNP in  recent  years.  About  one-third  of  this 
surplus  has  been  invested  in  government  securities,  and  most  of  the 
remainder  has  been  invested  in  the  Philippine  National  Bank  or  the 
Development  Bank  of  the  Philippines.  In  recent  years  the social  security 
institutions, particularly GSIS, have made equity investments at the direction 
of  the government, often in companies in financial difficulties.  As a result, 
the  character of  the  GSIS portfolio has deteriorated  substantially,  and the 
institution  now  owns  some  of  the  most  prominent  assets  slated  for 
privatization  by  the  Aquino government,  including the  Manila Hotel  and 
Philippine Airlines. Table 2.13  Consolidated Income and Expenditures of Loeal Governments, 1975-85  (percentage of GNP) 






















1.7  2.0  1.9  1.8  1.6  1.8  1.9  1.8  1.4  1.4  1.4 
0.6  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
0.4  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.3 
0.7  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6 
-- 
--  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
1.8  1.9  1.8  1.7  1.6  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.4  1.4  L_4  1.3 
1.5  1.6  1.6  1.5  1.4  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.2  1.3  1.3  1.2 
-  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.l  0.l  0.l 
-0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0 
-- 
Source:  Philippines, Ministry of Finance, Office of Local Governments. 
Nore: Components may not add to totals due to rounding. 427  PhilippinedChapter 2 
2.8  Government Financial Institutions and the Central Bank 
With the material  in  the previous sections and  tables we  are now  in  a 
position to assemble budget figures for the consolidated nonfinancial public 
sector in the Philippines. This consolidation is done in  table  2.16 below. 
However,  in  the  Philippines even  this  degree  of  consolidation misses  an 
important part of the fiscal story, since it excludes the operating balances of 
the state-owned financial institutions and the central bank. In the 1980s these 
bodies were used for fiscal operations, particularly for the rescue of failing 
private  corporations,  many  of  which  were  owned by  Marcos cronies.  In 
addition,  public  financial institutions were  forced  to  make  good  on  loan 
guarantees extended to private borrowers who could not meet their external 
debt service obligations. The losses of  the state-owned financial institutions 
and the central bank reached major proportions in the  1980s, rivaling the 
deficits of  the entire nonfinancial public sector. 
Only  very  limited  data  exist  on  the  balances  of  the  public  financial 
institutions, covering only the  1983-86  period. These are shown in tables 
2.14 and 2.15. Table 2.14 shows the balances of  the three major financial 
institutions, the Philippine National Bank (PNB), the Development Bank of 
the Philippines (DBP), and the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee 
Corporation (PhilGuarantee). Both PNB and DBP suffered major losses as a 
result of  the devaluations in  1983-84  and the following domestic recession. 
For PNB the losses arose primarily on domestic operations, particularly from 
the collapse of the sugar industry in  1985. 
The  Development Bank  of  the  Philippines  was  used  extensively  as  a 
corporate rescue agent in the 1980s. The period saw a sharp rise in DBP’s 
industrial loans and investments, many of them extended at the behest of the 
government to financially strapped firms (Lamberte 1984, 16- 17). DBP was 
also used to support domestic commercial banks associated with the Marcos 
government.  Equity  investments  totaling  P.  267  million  were  made  in 
Associated  Bank  and  Pilipinas  bank.  These  investments  were  in  turn 
rediscounted with the central bank, in effect channeling central bank funds to 
these two private banks at a cost far below that charged by the central bank 
on its emergency advances (1984,  17). By  the end of  1983 DBP had equity 
investments totalling P.  9.2 billion, or  17 percent of its assets, the bulk of 
which  were  in  banks,  hotels,  mining,  textile  manufacturing,  steel,  and 
construction.  A  remarkable  memorandum  from  the  director  of  DBP  to 
Marcos in  1983 lists the loans and investments made at the government’s 
behest. These totaled P.  28.2 billion ($2.5 billion at 1983 exchange rates), or 
over five times DBP’s capital (Tengco 1983, 1). 
In  1982 and  1983 support for the  deficits  of  the  state-owned  financial 
institutions came primarily from the central bank. The reserve money targets 
of the IMF program limited the use of central bank credit after 1983, and the 
burden of  supporting the deficits of  these financial institutions fell on  the 428  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
Table 2.14  Deficits of  Major Government Financial Institutions'  (in billions of  pesos) 
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-4.5 
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~  ~~  ~~~  ~  ~ 
Source:  IMF (1986a.  24). table 8; and IMF (1987). 
Nore: N.A. means data were not available, and a dash indicates the amount was negligible. 
*Philippine National Bank,  Development Bank  of  the Philippines,  and Philippine  Export and Foreign Loan 
Guarantee Corporation. 
bDomestic operations,  net payments on domestic guarantees, captial expenditures,  and sales of assets. 
'After  1985 debt rescheduling. 
dlnterest and principal repayments on foreign loans plus gross advances on foreign loan guarantees. 
national government, as is shown from the rapidly rising transfers in table 
2.14.  By  1985 these institutions had become a fiscal nightmare, and their 
annual losses amounted to more than 3 percent of GNP. 
What  table  2.14  does  not  adequately  show  is  the  capital  loss  and 
continuing obligation shouldered by the government as a result of the rapidly 
deteriorating loan portfolios of PNB and DBP. At the end of  1983, the DBP 
had  external liabilities of  approximately $1.5 billion, plus an  additional $1 
billion in outstanding foreign loan  guarantee^.^^ 
Even larger losses were suffered by the Philippine central bank during this 
period; in  the four years shown in table 2.15, central bank losses averaged 
3.5 percent of  GNP.  Some of  the reasons for this loss are indicated in the 
table.  The  central  bank  entered  a  number  of  forward  cover  and  swap 
contracts in the early  1980s. When  the exchange rate depreciated in  1983 
and 1984, the central bank was forced to accept the resulting losses. Much of 
the  forward  cover  was  extended  to  public  corporations,  particularly  the 429  PhilippineKhapter 2 
Table 2.15  Central Bank Net Income, 1983-86  (in billions of pesos) 
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Forward cover profits 
Swap profits/losses 
Total surplus/deficit 
(percent of GNP) 
-2.0  -8.3  -  15.6  N.A. 
-7.2  -  16.4  -  24.6  N.A. 
-0.7  -5.3  -  12.6  N.A. 
-  6.5  -11.1  -  12.0  N.A. 
5.2  8.1  9.0  N.A. 
-5.0  -5.3  -  7.6  N.A. 
-6.8  -  14.0  7.0  N.A. 
-  13.8  -27.6  -  15.5  -  16.9 
(3.6)  (5.2)  (2.6)  (2.8) 
Sources: Net  interest--“CB  Deficits  Mount  Due  to ‘Job’ Bills,”  Manila Chronicle,  15 September 1986, 
p.  I. Forward cover, swaps, and total-IMF  (1987). 
Note; N.A.  = not available. 
PNOC.33 Swap contracts were entered with domestic commercial banks and 
their  foreign  currency  deposit  units,  as  a  way  of  encouraging  further 
international borrowing. Losses under both of these contracts were posted in 
every year, except in  1985 when the peso appreciated and the central bank 
earned a profit on its swaps. 
Much  of  the  loss  of  the  central  bank  during  this  period  came  from 
increased net  interest payments in  1984 and  1985. In order to reduce the 
domestic money supply, the central bank sold its own bills in 1984 and again 
in  1986, sometimes at rates in excess of 40 percent per annurn. Outstanding 
central bank securities, net of  repurchase agreements, reached almost P.  40 
billion  ($2 billion) by  September  1985. Additional losses came  from  the 
external liabilities of  the central bank. Net foreign assets of  the central bank 
turned negative in 1982, and by  the end of  1984 the net external liabilities of 
the central bank had reached P.  35 billion ($1.8 billion), almost 6 percent of 
GNP. 
The most difficult effect to gauge is  the  weakening of  the central bank 
portfolio from  the emergency advances to  financial institutions and,  indi- 
rectly,  to  troubled  nonfinancial  firms  in  the  private  sector.  Assistance to 
financial  institutions  increased  sharply  at  the  end  of  1984  during  the 
adjustment crisis and again in early 1986 during the post-election boycott of 
government-associated banks. The central bank was also exposed to the two 
troubled government financial institutions, PNB and DBP,  having indirectly 
supported some  of  their  rescue operations of  private  firms. Central bank 
emergency loans and overdrafts to financial institutions reached P.  11 billion 
(2 percent of GNP) at the end of  1984. Of this, P.  1 billion was to specialized 
government financial institutions, a category made up almost entirely by DBP. 
These  and  other  issues  surrounding  the  Philippine  financial  system  are 
discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 430  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
2.9  Consolidated Budget 
We  can combine the  accounts  of  the  various  units  of  the  public  sector, 
netting out the transfers among them, to arrive at a consolidated public sector 
budget.  Two consolidations  are  shown  in  table  2.16.  The  first  is  of  the 
nonfinancial  public  sector,  which  includes  the  national  and  local  govern- 
ments, social security institutions, and public nonfinancial corporations. The 
second  consolidation,  available  only  for  1983 through  1986, adds  in  the 
major public financial institutions and the central bank. 
Several things are apparent from the consolidations.  The first is that the 
relatively  low deficit of the national government between  1978 and  1980 is 
deceptive. Most of the public sector deficit was contained in the accounts of 
public  sector  corporations,  although  this  information  was  not  readily 
available at the time,  and the consolidated nonfinancial  public sector deficit 
was about three times that of the national government. 
Although  the  consolidated  figures  are  larger,  the jump in  the  deficit  in 
1981 and 1982 was not as dramatic as that of the national government.  What 
is also apparent is the momentum of the public  sector deficit in the critical 
1982-83  period,  despite  the  efforts of  the  national  government  to change 
fiscal course. Continued investments by public corporations in 1983 added to 
the deficit,  while  the  huge  increase in  losses of  the  public  financial  sector 
continued the deficits after  1983. 
While the deficit figures contained in table 2.16 are respectable,  they are 
not extraordinarily large. The nonfinancial public sector deficit never reaches 
6 percent of GNP, while even with the losses of public financial institutions, 
the combined deficit peaks at just over 8 percent of GNP. While public sector 
deficits play a role in the drift of the Philippines into debt crisis, they are not 
the sole, nor perhaps the most important, explanation. 
The problems caused by  the  public  sector deficits in  the Philippines  are 
more  a  matter  of  timing  and  content  than  size.  The  Philippines  was 
unfortunate to have had a sharp increase in the deficit of the public sector at 
precisely  the time when  external signals called for a scaling back of public 
borrowing to limit  external  borrowing.  A more fundamental  difficulty  that 
the  Philippines  had  was  the  increasing  weakness  of  public  investment 
expenditure. Analyses of sustainable foreign borrowing make the distinction 
between  borrowing  for  investment  and  borrowing  for  consumption.  Al- 
though  the  Philippines  maintained  high  and  increasing  rates  of  public 
investment,  in  fact  what  was  purchased  with  that  investment  expenditure 
made it little different from consumption. 
Much  of  public  sector  investment  in  the  1980s  was  loans  and  equity 
contributions to failing private sector corporations,  absorbing  the  losses of 
those enterprises.  Certainly not  all, but much of the Philippine  investment 
effort was ill advised,  in assets that never paid out or, in some cases, never 
materialized.  Public sector investment took on a momentum of its own and Table 2.16  Public Sector Balances (percentage of GNP) 






Total equity, net lending 
Aid to GCs 

















































































































11.4  12.0 
15.7  14.0 
9.2  9.1 
3.0  2.7 
3.5  2.1 
3.0  2.1 
0.4  0.0 
2.2  2.9 
-4.3  -2.0 
1.9  1.8 
0.8  0.8 
1.7  1.7 
1.5  1.5 
0.2  0.2 
0.3  0.3 
0.1  0.1 
0.3  0.3 
1.2  1.0 
0.9  0.8 
5.0  4.9 
3.0  2.1 
-0.1  0.7 





































































0.4 Table 2.16  (continued) 
~ 
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 




Public finuncial sector 
Surplus of GFIs 
Net income of central bank 
Contributions from national government 
Surplus/deficit 
Consolidated public sector 
Surplus/deficitb 
7.5  7.5  8.2  10.4  9.0  8.2  6.9 
4.5  5.8  5.2  4.7  3.6  5.0  4.1 
-2.9  -1.7  -3.0  -5.7  -5.4  -3.2  -2.8 
-1.4  -1.6 
-3.6  -5.2 
0.0  1.6 
-5.0  -5.3 
-8.2  -8.3 
6.4 
4.3 














Source; Tables 2.1, 2.7. 2.10,  2.13, and the Philippines, Government Corporate Monitoring Committee. 
Note: GCs are government corporations and GFIs are government financial institutions. 
'National  government,  local government,  social  security institutions, and nonfinancial public sector corporations,  net  of  interagency 
transfers and investments. 
bConsolidation of  nonfinancial public sector and public sector financial institutions, net of  interagency transfers and investments. 433  PhilippineKhapter 3 
became more of  a way of assuring foreign currency inflows than a means of 
creating capital stock.  New  projects  were  started as late as  1983, despite 
delays  and  stretch-outs  of  existing  projects  due  to  the  inability  of  the 
government  to  come  up  with  counterpart  funds.  Current  expenditure, 
particularly  operations  and  maintenance  expenditures,  were  cut  back  to 
sustain investment, in  some cases prematurely retiring the existing capital 
stock. 
Finally, the Philippines shifted the public sector deficit from the national 
government  to  public  corporations  and  later  to  government  financial 
institutions and the central bank, using the borrowing ability of each to keep 
the system afloat, until the process could no longer be sustained. 
3  Trade Policy, Industrial Policy, 
and the Exchange Rate 
Trade and industrialization policy have been the vortex of  Philippine eco- 
nomic  debate.  Trade  policy  has  been  more  extensively  argued  in  the 
Philippines than has any other economic policy, starting with the outcry over 
the  administration of  the  import  control program  in  the early  1950s  and 
extending  through  the  current  debates  on  import  liberalization.  This 
prominence is reflected in research on the Philippine economy, and there is 
now an extensive literature on Philippine trade and industrial policy.  Trade 
policy issues are also central to our analysis of the Philippine debt crisis. In 
comparative studies of  LDC borrowers, the extent to which exports grew 
appears to play  a key  role  in  determining whether  or not  countries were 
forced to reschedule.2 In the Philippines in particular, trade and industrial 
policy were powerful forces behind the slide of the economy into crisis in the 
1980s. 
Despite  the importance given  to industrial and  trade policy,  Philippine 
industrial and trade performance has been largely disappointing. The initial 
period  of  import  substitution led  to  rapid  economic growth  in  the  early 
1950s. However,  in  what  has  now  become  a  classic  pattern  of  import 
substitution, growth slowed as the industries that  were created reached the 
limits of  the domestic market and as their high dependence on imports of 
capital goods and intermediates meant that the growth of  the economy as a 
whole was limited by  recurrent balance of  payments crises. The Philippines 
went  through  an  import  decontrol program  in  the  early  1960s,  but  with 
disappointing results. Economic growth remained sluggish,  particularly  in 
the manufacturing sector, and the country failed to develop significant new 
export industries. 